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E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR: FOURTH REVISED DRAFT OF SPC VERIFICATION PAPER

VIENNA FOR USDEL MBFR

REF: A) USNATO 236; B) USNATO 497; C) USNATO 861

1. THERE FOLLOWS TEXT OF FOURTH REVISED DRAFT OF SPC VERIFICATION PAPER, WHICH IS AMLGAMATION OF REF A TEXT, REF B REVISIONS AND FURTHER CHANGES RESULTING FROM FEB 14 SPC MEETING REPORTED REF C. SEPTTEL REPORTS ON OTHER PROPOSED CHANGES RESULTING FROM FEB 26 SPC MEETING AS WELL AS SEPARATE BILATERAL U.S./UK ACTIONS WHICH DO NOT APPEAR IN PRESENT TEXT.

2. BEGIN TEXT

VERIFICATION AND INSPECTION IN MBFR

REPORT BY THE POLITICAL COMMITTEE AT SENIOR LEVEL

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE BASIC ALLIED POSITION ON VERIFICATION IN MBFR IS CONTAINED IN C-M(73)83(FINAL), PARAGRAPH 15, WHICH READS AS

FOLLOWS: "ANY MBFR AGREEMENT MUST CONTAIN APPROPRIATE VERIFICATION PROVISIONS, INCLUDING NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL MEANS, BEARING IN MIND THAT THE MODALITIES AND EXTENT OF VERIFICATION, INCLUDING INSPECTION, WOULD DEPEND ON THE CONTENT AND NATURE OF THE AGREEMENTS REACHED. NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS. ANY MBFR AGREEMENT SHOULD BE VERIFIABLE WITHOUT ADDITIONAL NEGOTIATED PROVISIONS FOR MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION. IT IS NEVERTHELESS DESIRABLE TO SEEK MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION PROVISIONS."

2. IN ADDITION, PARAGRAPH 32 STATES: "THE ALLIES WILL ON THE BASIS OF RECIPROCITY SEEK AGREEMENT ON VERIFICATION MEASURES TO ENSURE THAT THE PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS ARE BEING CARRIED OUT, TO BUILD MUTUAL CONFIDENCE, AND TO ENHANCE WARNING IN THE EVENT OF A PACT BUILD-UP. ALL VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE DESIGNED IN SUCH A WAY AS NOT TO GIVE THE SOVIETS MEANS OF INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES."

3. PARAGRAPH 33 STIPULATES THAT "NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF MBFR AGREEMENTS", AND THAT "IN ADDITION, THE ALLIES WILL SEEK

AGREEMENT ON OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES (I.E. ADVERSARY ON-SITE INSPECTION MEASURES) APPLICABLE TO THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA." IT STATES THAT FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF DETAILED PROPOSALS ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION IS REQUIRED.

4. WITHIN THESE TERMS OF REFERENCE, THE SENIOR POLITICAL COMMITTEE, WITH MILITARY/TECHNICAL INPUT FROM THE MBFR WORKING GROUP, HAS BEEN ENGAGED IN CONSIDERING OVERT VERIFICATION POSSIBILITIES AND DEVELOPING SPECIFIC PROPOSALS. THIS REPORT CONTAINS THE COMMITTEE'S FINDINGS. IT RECOMMENDS THE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF ACCEPTABLE AND FEASIBLE NEGOTIATED INSPECTION POSSIBILITIES, RECOGNISING OF COURSE THAT THE FINAL CHOICE OF MEASURES AND THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF EACH IN ANY OVERALL
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INSPECTION SCHEME CAN BE DECIDED ONLY AS THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION DEVELOPS.

II. GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS

5. THE ALLIES RECOGNISE THAT NON-INTERFERENCE WITH NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS WILL BE A NECESSARY PROVISION OF ANY MBFR AGREEMENT. (IN THIS CONTEXT THE PROBLEM OF ADEQUATE PARTICIPATION OF ALLIES IN THE ANALYSIS OF DATA ARRIVED AT BY NATIONAL TECHNICAL MEANS NEEDS TO BE SOLVED.) OR (A QUESTION RELATED TO THIS POINT IS THE INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISM THE ALLIANCE WILL USE TO ARRIVE AT VERIFICATION JUDGEMENTS. THIS

WILL REQUIRE A SEPARATE STUDY AT A TIME WHEN THE NATURE OF THE OVERT VERIFICATION SYSTEM HAS BECOME CLEARER. IN THE MEANTIME, IT IS RECOGNISED THAT THE ALLIES WILL BE INTERESTED IN SHARING INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR REACHING INDEPENDENT AND COLLECTIVE JUDGEMENTS REGARDING WARSAW PACT COMPLIANCE WITH ANY MBFR AGREEMENT.)

ADVANTAGES OF NEGOTIATED INSPECTION

6. THE ALLIES WILL SEEK OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES (I.E. ADVERSARY ON-SITE INSPECTION MEASURES) SINCE THEY COULD HAVE THE ADVANTAGES OF:

(A) ENABLING THOSE ALLIED COUNTRIES WITH LITTLE OR NO NATIONAL TECHNICAL INTELLIGENCE MEANS TO PARTICIPATE ACTIVELY IN THE VERIFICATION PROCESS;

(B) PROVIDING MORE DIRECT MBFR MONITORING FOR ALL ALLIED COUNTRIES INVOLVED;

(C) MEETING ALLIED DOMESTIC POLITICAL AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS REQUIREMENTS. OVERT MULTINATIONAL VERIFICATION WOULD BE MORE EFFECTIVE THAN PURELY NATIONAL MEANS IN BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN PARLIAMENTS AND IN PUBLICS THAT THE MBFR AGREEMENTS WERE BEING OBSERVED AND THAT VIOLATORS WOULD BE DETECTED. EVEN IF THE WESTERN VERIFICATION PROPOSALS WERE REJECTED, THE ALLIES'

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ADVOCACY OF OVERT INSPECTION WOULD BE A PUBLIC DEMONSTRATION OF THEIR GOOD FAITH WITH REGARD TO MBFR;

(D) BEING MORE EFFECTIVE THAN NATIONAL MEANS IN PROVIDING A BASIS FOR CONFRONTING A VIOLATOR WITH EVIDENCE OF HIS VIOLATION. SINCE THE EVIDENCE WOULD BE GATHERED BY SEVERAL NATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENT, IT WOULD BE MORE CREDIBLE THAN IF GENERATED EXCLUSIVELY BY NATIONAL MEANS. IT WOULD ALSO BE MORE LIKELY TO BE RELEASABLE THAN NATIONAL EVIDENCE, SINCE THE LATTER IS OFTEN DETECTED OR PRIMARILY EVALUATED THROUGH HIGHLY CLASSIFIED MEANS;

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(E) FILLING GAPS AND RESOLVING AMBIGUITIES IN EXISTING INFORMATION AND SHORTENING THE TIME REQUIRED TO MAKE VERIFICATION JUDGEMENTS;

(F) DETERRING VIOLATIONS BY INCREASING THE POSSIBILIYOF THEIR DETECTION;

(G) INCREASING WARNING TIME(1), A VERY IMPORTANT CONTRI-BUTION TO NATO'S SECURITY WHICH COULD RESULT FROM OVERT VERIFICATION. THE AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL WARNING TIME CANNOT BE QUANTIFIED PRECISELY. ANY ADDITIONAL WARNING TIME WOULD BE OF VALUE IN MANAGING A CRISIS SITUATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE;

(H) INDICATING WILLINGNESS OF THE TWO SIDES TO BE MORE OPEN ABOUT MILITARY ACTIVITIES, THEREBY ENHANCING EAST-WEST CONFIDENCE.

RECIPROCITY

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7. ANY NEGOTIATED INSPECTION MEASURES AGREED UPON WOULD HAVE TO BE APPLIED RECIPROCALLY. IN GENERAL IT SEEMS UNLIKELY THAT THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES WOULD ACCEPT ON THEIR TERRITORY ARRANGEMENTS SO INTRUSIVE THAT RECIPROCAL APPLICATION WOULD HARM

WESTERN INTERESTS. NEVERTHELESS, EACH POSSIBLE OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM, IN CONJUNCTION WITH ANY AGREED REDUCTION MEASURES, MUST BE CAREFULLY EXAMINED TO DETERMINE WHETHER ITS APPLICATION ON ALLIED TERRITORY WOULD BE ACCEPTABLE(2).

NON-INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS

8. NO OVERT VERIFICATION MEASURES SHOULD BE ACCEPTED WHICH MIGHT GIVE THE SOVIETS MEANS OF INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES. HOWEVER, THE PRESENCE

AND LEGAL ACTIVITIES OF WARSAW PACT INSPECTORATES ON THE ALLIED TERRITORY CONCERNED WOULD NOT PER SE NECESSARILY CONSTITUTE INTERFERENCE IN WESTERN EUROPEAN AFFAIRS.

(POSSIBLE MEASURES OUTSIDE NATO GUIDELINES AREA)

9. (TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED, THERE SHOULD BE OVERT VERIFICATION OF ANY MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED TO APPLY OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL REGION IN GENERAL AND FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE FLANKS IN PARTICULAR, WITHOUT DETERIMENT TO THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 17 OF C-M(73)83(FINAL).) OR (THE POSSIBILITY OF OVERT VERIFICATION OF ANY MEASURES WHICH MIGHT BE NEGOTIATED TO APPLY OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL REGION IN GENERAL AND FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE FLANKS IN PARTICULAR SHOULD BE TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION.)

STAFFING OF INSPECTORATES

10. SUBJECT TO FURTHER ALLIED STUDIES, INSPECTORATES IN THE CENTRAL REGION WOULD BE STAFFED WITH PERSONNEL FROM THOSE NATIONS WITH FORCES OR TERRITORIES IN THE NATO GUIDELINES AREA; FLANK COUNTRIES WOULD PARTICIPATE IN ANY INSPECTORATES WHICH MIGHT BE ESTABLISHED OUTSIDE THE CENTRAL REGION (; AND ANY AGREEMENTS ON NEGOTIATED INSPECTION WOULD CONTAIN PROVISIONS FOR THE ASSIGNING OF ALLIED (INCLUDING HOST COUNTRY) LIAISON
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OFFICERS TO WARSAW PACT INSPECTION TEAMS ON ALLIED TERRITORY, AND VICE VERSA). OR (IN PUTTING FORWARD THEIR PROPOSALS FOR OVERT VERIFICATION, THE ALLIES AGREE NOT TO INCLUDE A PROVISION FOR ATTACHING LIAISON OFFICERS TO INSPECTORATES. SHOULD THE SOVIETS LATER REQUIRE THEIR INCLUSION, THE ALLIES WILL BE PREPARED TO ACCEDE TO SUCH A PRINCIPLE. IN DOING SO, HOWEVER, THEY WOULD INFORM THE SOVIETS THAT THEIR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE WILL BE CONTINGENT ON EASTERN AGREEMENT TO SPECIFIC RULES WHICH WOULD REGULATE LIAISON OFFICER SACTIVITY.)

ADMINISTRATION AND CONTROL

11. NEGOTIATED OVERT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES BY THE ALLIES SHOULD BE ADMINISTERED BY NATO. POLICY GUIDANCE SHOULD EMANATE FROM THE COUNCIL AND OVERALL TECHNICAL DIRECTION SHOULD BE CARRIED OUT BY A COMPETENT HEADQUARTERS ON BEHALF OF THE COUNCIL.

12. THE PRODUCT OF NEGOTIATED OVERT VERIFICATION ACTIVITIES BY ALLIED COUNTRIES SHOULD BE MADE AVAILABLE WITHOUT UNDUE DELAY TO ALL MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE.

NEGOTIATING STRATEGY

13. THE SOVIETS ARE LIKELY TO BE MORE RECEPTIVE TO VERIFICATION TO THE EXTENT THAT IS IS LINKED TO REDUCTION

MEASURES ON WHOSE SUBSTANCE THEY MAY HAVE ALREADY AGREED. THEREFORE, THE ACCEPTABILITY OF SPECIFIC PROPOSALS WOULD BE INCREASED IF THEY WERE PUT FORWARD ONLY AT A RELATIVELY LATE STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN, IN ARGUING FOR THEIR ACCEPTANCE, THE ALLIES CAN RELATE THEM TO THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF REDUCTIONS.

14. INDEPENDENTLY OF THE TABLING OF ANY SPECIFIC PROPOSALS, THE ALLIES SHOULD MAKE IT CLEAR TO THE OTHER SIDE AT ALL STAGES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS THAT THE WEST WANTS OVERT VERIFICATION AS A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE.

15. VERIFICATION ARRANGEMENTS AGREED FOR FIRST PHASE REDUCTIONS ARE LIKELY TO INFLUENCE SIMILAR ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE SECOND PHASE. SOME VERIFICATION MEASURES (E.G. VERIFICATION OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS) WOULD NORMALLY EXTEND INTO AND BEYOND THE SECOND PHASE. THE WARSAW PACT SHOULD BE PUT ON
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NOTICE THAT VERIFICATION MEASURES CHOSEN FOR THE FIRST PHASE MAY NEED TO BE ALTERED OR EXPANDED IN THE SECOND PHASE.

III. POSSIBLE OBJECTIVES

16. (LEFT BLANK TO AVOID RE-NUMBERING OF SUBSEQUENT PARAGRAPHS.)

VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS

17. CLOSE OBSERVATION OF WITHDRAWALS IN AN IMPORTANT ALLIED OBJECTIVE, AND HIGH PRIORITY SHOULD BE ASSIGNED TO ITS SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATION. IT WOULD INVOLVE THE DEPLOYMENT OF INSPECTORATES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOR THE DURATION OF THE WITHDRAWALS TO MONITOR COMPLIANCE WITH THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT. THIS OBJECTIVE SEEMS TECHNICALLY SOUND AND WOULD NOT BE LIKELY TO INVOLVE NATO IN UNACCEPTABLE RECIPROCITY.

VERIFICATION OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS

18. THIS OBJECTIVE IS OF EQUAL IMPORTANCE TO THE ALLIES AS VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS. IT COULD INVOLVE THE ASSIGNMENT OF INSPECTORATES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS FOLLOWING WITHDRAWALS. (THE INSPECTORATES WOULD HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS CONTINUOUSLY FOR AS LONG AS THE MBFR AGREEMENT WAS IN FORCE. IN PRACTICE, HOWEVER, IT MIGHT NOT BE NECESSARY FOR THEM TO BE IN THE AREA AT ALL TIMES.) THE INSPECTORATES WOULD, IN ADDITION TO MONITORING COMPLIANCE WITH THE AGREEMENT, HAVE ALL OF THE POLITICAL ADVANTAGES SET OUT IN PARAGRAPH 6 ABOVE. ALTHOUGH IT WOULD NOT BE FEASIBLE TO ACHIEVE COMPLETE ACCURACY IN THE VERIFICATION OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, PARTICULARLY IN PERSONNEL, IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO VERIFY COMPLIANCE IN BROAD TERMS.

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VERIFICATION OF STABILISING MEASURES

19. IN NEGOTIATING ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE VERIFICATION OF WITHDRAWALS AND POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, THE ALLIES SHOULD TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE RELEVANCE OF SUCH ARRANGEMENTS TO THE POSSIBLE VERIFICATION OF STABILISING MEASURES. (THE THE EXTENT REQUIRED, THERE SHOULD BE OVERT INSPECTION OF WHATEVER STABILISING MEASURES ARE NEGOTIATED.)

IV. SPECIFIC MEASURES

20. ASSESSMENTS IN THIS SECTION WERE MADE IN THE LIGHT OF THE MBFR WORKING GROUP REPORT ON "NEGOTIATED INSPECTION AND VERIFICATION" IN MBFR (AC/276-WP(73)43(REVISED) OF 30TH NOVEMBER, 1973). THIS DOCUMENT, AS WELL AS THE US PAPER(3) ON "NEGOTIATED INSPECTION IN MBFR" OF 5TH OCTOBER, 1973 TO WHICH IT REFERS, ARE AT ANNEX. ADDITIONAL DETAILED TECHNICAL STUDY WILL BE REQUIRED ON EACH OF THE FOLLOWING MEASURES PRIOR TO AGREEMENT. HOWEVER, THE MEASURES COULD BE PRESENTED AT AN APPROPRIATE TIME TO THE
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OTHER SIDE IN BROAD OUTLINE PRIOR TO COMPLETION OF TECHNICAL STUDIES.

A. USE OF MOBILE TEAMS AND/OR FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS TO MONITOR AGREED WITHDRAWALS

21. THIS MEASURE COULD INVOLVE EITHER OR BOTH OF THE FOLLOWING:

(A) THE DEPLOYMENT OF MOBILE TEAMS TO ACCOMPANY WITHDRAWING UNITS FROM THEIR BARRACKS TO THE ROAD OR RAIL CROSSING POINTS INTO THE USSR OR OTHER EXIT POINTS BEING USED FOR WITHDRAWALS;

(B) THE STATIONING OF OBSERVERS AT FIXED POSTS AT THE ABOVE-MENTIONED CROSSING POINTS. (SOME 25 MEN AT EACH.)

22. FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, MOBILE TEAMS ARE PREFERABLE TO FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS BECAUSE OF THEIR GREATER FLEXIBILITY, EFFICIENCY AND ECONOMY; THEY ARE MORE DIFFICULT TO CIRCUMVENT AND REQUIRE FEWER MEN TO STAFF. IN PRINCIPLE, THEY CAN PERFORM ALL OF THE FUNCTIONS OF FIXED POSTS, WHILE THE REVERSE IS NOT TRUE. THEY ALSO HAVE GREATER INTELLIGENCE GATHERING POTENTIAL THAN FIXED OBSERVATION POSTS. IN THE MONITORING OF WITHDRAWALS, THE CHIEF MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF MOBILE TEAMS OVER STATIONED OBSERVERS IS THAT ONLY THE FORMER COULD DETERMINE PRECISELY WHICH KINDS AND SIZES OF UNITS HAD BEEN WITHDRAWN AND WHAT THE ORDER OF BATTLE HAD BEEN AT PARTICULAR MILITARY POSTS, USEFUL INFORMATION FOR POST-REDUCTION ORDER OF BATTLE ANALYSIS IN SUPPORT OF MONITORING. BOTH SYSTEMS ARE TECHNICALLY FEASIBLE AND WOULD INVOLVE NATO IN NON UN-ACCEPTABLE RECIPROCITY WHETHER IMPLEMENTED ON THEIR OWN OR AS A COMBINATION. HOWEVER, PARTICULARLY IN THE REDUCTION PHASE, STATIC POSTS COULD PERFORM A MOST USEFUL FUNCTION AT MAJOR EXIT POINTS. FROM A MILITARY POINT OF VIEW, THEREFORE, THE IDEAL SYSTEM WOULD BE A MOBILE ONE SUPPORTED BY SOME STATIC POSTS.

23. FOR WITHDRAWAL MONITORING, NEITHER SYSTEM HAS ANY SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ADVANTAGE TO NATO OVER THE OTHER, AND NEITHER HAS SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL DRAWBACKS. (HOWEVER, THERE ARE SECRET

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SOME POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES TO FIXED POSTS FOR THE LONG-TERM MONITORING OF POST REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS (SEE PARAGRAPH 28). THEREFORE, DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS IT SHOULD BE BORNE IN MIND THAT AGREEMENT TO FIXED POSTS TO MONITOR WITHDRAWALS MIGHT MAKE IT MORE DIFFICULT TO AVOID FIXED POSTS (SHOULD THIS BE DESIRED) FOR THE LONG-TERM MONITORING OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, OR (FOR THE LONG-TERM MONITORING OF POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS, THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF BOTH SYSTEMS NEED FURTHER STUDY.)

24. THE SOVIETS MIGHT BE WILLING TO CONCEDE 21(B) IN ORDER TO PROVE THAT THEY ARE FULFILLING THEIR SIDE OF AN MBFR AGREEMENT. THEIR WILLINGNESS TO CONCEDE 21(A) IS MORE QUESTIONABLE, SINCE THE ABOVE-CITED ADVANTAGES TO THE WEST OF MOBILE TEAMS WOULD BE PERCEIVED AS DISADVANTAGES BY THE SOVIETS.

HOWEVER, THE POSSIBILITY OF NEGOTIATING BOTH IS NOT EXCLUDED.

25. CONCLUSION: (BECAUSE OF THE ADVANTAGES OF MOBILE TEAMS AND FOR REASONS OF NEGOTIATING TACTICS, THE ALLIES SHOULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE 21(A) EXCLUSIVELY. ONLY IF MOBILE TEAMS PROVE NON-NEGOTIABLE, SHOULD THE ALLIES ADVANCE 21(B) TO THE OTHER SIDE.)

OR

(THE ALLIES SHOULD INITIALLY ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE FOR A COMBINATION OF BOTH SYSTEMS. IF THIS APPROACH PROVES ABORTIVE, THEN A SYSTEM BASED ON MOBILE TEAMS SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED, SINCE INTER ALIA THIS IS THE SYSTEM WHICH SHOULD PROVE MOST EFFECTIVE FOR VERIFICATION OF THE POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS (SEE PARAGRAPH 30 BELOW). ONLY IF MOBILE TEAMS PROVE NON-NEGOTIABLE SHOULD THE ALLIES ACCEPT THE SYSTEM DESCRIBED AT 21(B) ABOVE.)

B. USE OF MOBILE TEAMS AND/OR FIXED POSTS (STATIC PERIMETER POSTS AND/OR CHOKE POINT POSTS) TO MONITOR POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS

26. THE US PAPER OF 5TH OCTOBER SUGGESTS A MINIMUM OF 10 TWO-MAN MOBILE TEAMS IN EAST GERMANY, 7 TO 8 TWO-MAN TEAMS IN CZECHOSLOVAKIA, AND 7 TO 10 TWO-MAN TEAMS IN POLAND. HOWEVER, A NATO STUDY(4) HAS ADVOCATED THE MUCH LARGER TOTAL OF 130 TWO-MAN
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TEAMS BASED ON 20 DIFFERENT SUB-HEADQUARTERS. BECAUSE OF THE CONSIDERABLE DISCREPANCY BETWEEN THESE TWO SUGGESTIONS, FURTHER STUDY IS NECESSARY TO DETERMINE THE NUMBER OF TEAMS REQUIRED. IT WOULD BE IN NATO'S PURELY MILITARY INTEREST TO ACHIEVE A MAXIMUM DENSITY OF TEAMS. HOWEVER, CAREFUL CONSIDERATION MUST BE GIVEN TO THE NUMBER OF WARSAW PACT INSPECTION PERSONNEL WHICH COULD BE TOLERATED ON ALLIED TERRITORY FROM A DOMESTIC POLITICAL POINT OF VIEW, KEEPING IN MIND THAT THIS VERIFICATION PROVISION WOULD PROBABLY LAST AS LONG AS THE MBFR AGREEMENT REMAINED IN FORCE.

27. STATIC PERIMETER POSTS AND/OR CHOKE POINT POSTS(5) COULD BE USED (IN PLACE OF OR) AS SUPPLEMENT TO MOBILE TEAMS. AS THEIR NAMES IMPLY, THEY WOULD BE LOCATED PRIMARILY AT KEY CROSSING POINTS ON THE PERIPHERY OF THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS AND AT MAJOR TRANSPORTATION HUBS WITHIN THE AREA. HOWEVER, MOBILE TEAMS ARE PREFERABLE FOR THE MILITARY REASONS LISTED IN PARAGRAPH 22 TO STATIC POSTS WHICH, ON THEIR OWN, WOULD BE A VERY POOR AND EXPENSIVE WAY OF TRYING TO VERIFY POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS.

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28. POLITICALLY, MOBILE TEAMS ARE PREFERABLE TO FIXED POSTS SINCE THE LATTER, AND PARTICULARLY THE PERIMETER POSTS, COULD BE INTERPRETED AS DELINEATING A SPECIAL REDUCTIONS ZONE IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

29. MOBILE TEAMS MIGHT BE MORE DIFFICULT TO NEGOTIATE THAN FIXED POSTS, SINCE THE OTHER SIDE MIGHT PERCEIVE OF THE FORMER AS LESS SUSCEPTIBLE TO DECEPTION AND CIRCUMVENTION. IN PRINCIPLE, HOWEVER, MOBILE TEAMS APPEAR NEGOTIABLE.

30. CONCLUSION: (THE ALLIES SHOULD MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO NEGOTIATE THE EXCLUSIVE USE OF MOBILE TEAMS, AS OUTLINED IN B ABOVE, AND SHOULD NEGOTIATE ADEQUATE ACCESS BY THESE TEAMS TO KEY TRANSPORTATION ROUTES INTO AND WITHIN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS. SINCE PERIMETER POSTS AND CHOKE POINT POSTS ARE A VERY POOR SECOND BEST TO MOBILE TEAMS, THEY SHOULD BE PROPOSED TO THE OTHER SIDE ONLY IF MOBILE TEAMS PROVE TO BE NON-NEGOTIABLE.)

OR

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(THE ALLIES SHOULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE THE USE OF MOBILE TEAMS SUPPLEMENTED BY STATIC TEAMS AT CHOKE POINTS. SHOULD THIS APPROACH FAIL, MOBILE TEAMS SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED, SINCE PERIMETER POSTS AND CHOKE POINT POSTS ARE A VERY POOR SECOND BEST TO MOBILE TEAMS. HOWEVER, FROM THE MILITARY VIEW ALONE A SYSTEM INVOLVING A REDUCED NUMBER OF MOBILE TEAMS WITH SOME STATIC POSTS WOULD BE PREFERABLE TO A LARGER NUMBER OF EITHER MOBILE OR STATIC POSTS ON THEIR OWN.)

OR

(THE ALLIES COULD ATTEMPT TO NEGOTIATE THE USE OF
MOBILE TEAMS, STATIC TEAMS AT CHOKE POINTS AND/OR STATIC
PERIMETER POSTS.)

C. "OPEN SKIES PROPOSAL", I.E. THAT MANNED AIRBORNE
RECONNAISSANCE SYSTEMS BE USED TO MONITOR AGREED WITH-
DRAWALS AND/OR POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS

31. THE SYSTEMS WOULD BE EQUIPPED WITH A VARIETY OF SENSORS,
MOSTLY PHOTOGRAPHIC. INSPECTORS WOULD FLY ABOARD AIRCRAFT
BELONGING TO THE OTHER SIDE (NORMALLY TO THE INSPECTED COUNTRY),
UTILISE SENSORS PROVIDED BY THE OTHER SIDE (6), AND BE ACCOMPANIED
BY LIAISON OFFICERS OF THE INSPECTED COUNTRY. THE FLIGHTS WOULD
ORIGINATE IN THE INSPECTED COUNTRY, ADVANCE NOTICE OF THE FLIGHTS
WOULD BE GIVEN, AND THEY WOULD BE CARRIED OUT ON PRESCRIBED
ROUTES AND ALTITUDES. NATO SHOULD AIM FOR MAXIMUM FLIGHT
FREEDOM COMPATIBLE WITH MUTUAL POLITICAL ACCEPTABILITY, FLIGHT
SAFETY AND THE SECURITY OF CLASSIFIED INFORMATION.

32. THE MAIN MILITARY ADVANTAGE OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
OVER GROUND OBSERVATION LIES IN ITS ABILITY TO COVER LARGE
GEOGRAPHIC AREAS IN SHORT PERIODS OF TIME. A TECHNICAL DRAWBACK
IN RELATION TO GROUND OBSERVATION IS THE SUSCEPTIBILITY OF
AIRBORNE SYSTEMS TO ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS. IN THE AREA OF
REDUCTIONS BAD WEATHER COULD FREQUENTLY PRECLUDE AERIAL
PHOTOGRAPHY. THIS MEASURE WOULD BE A COMPLEMENT TO GROUND
OBSERVATION - NOT A SUBSTITUTE FOR IT.

3. POLITICAL ADVANTAGES: THE APPLICATION OF THIS MEASURE
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WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THE PARTICIPATION OF SEVERAL
NATO COUNTRIES IN THIS FORM OF SURVEILLANCE, AS THE LEVEL OF
TECHNOLOGY IS WITHIN THEIR MEANS. THIS PARTICIPATION WOULD TEND
TO FOSTER PUBLIC AND PARLIAMENTARY CONFIDENCE IN THE OBSERVANCE
OF THE AGREEMENT. POLITICAL DISADVANTAGES: THE GROUND PERSONNEL
AND INFRASTRUCTURE REQUIRED TO SUPPORT AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE
MIGHT BE EXPENSIVE. ALSO, EACH SIDE MIGHT INTERPRET THE IMPLE-
MENTATION OF AIR SAFETY RESTRICTIONS BY THE OTHER AS AN ATTEMPT
TO CONCEAL SOMETHING, AND FRICTION COULD RESULT. PUBLIC AND
PARLIAMENTARY OPINION IN SOME ALLIED COUNTRIES MIGHT OBJECT TO
WARSAW PACT AERIAL INSPECTION OF THEIR TERRITORY ON THE GROUNDS
THAT IT WAS TOO ENCOMPASSING AND INTRUSIVE. WHILE GROUND
INSPECTORS COULD BE LIMITED LARGELY TO VERIFYING COMPLIANCE WITH
MBFR AGREEMENTS, AERIAL INSPECTORS COULD, AT LEAST IN PRINCIPLE,
GLEAN INTELLIGENCE ON A WIDE RANGE OF MATTERS OVER VERY LARGE
AREAS. APPLICATION OF THIS MEASURE OVER ALLIED TERRITORY WOULD
BE ACCEPTABLE ONLY IF LIMITED AS DESCRIBED IN PARAGRAPH 31 ABOVE.

34. WARSAW PACT GOVERNMENTS MIGHT HAVE SIMILAR OBJECTIONS TO NATO AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE OF THEIR TERRITORY. BECAUSE OF THE POSSIBLE CONCERN OF BOTH SIDES ABOUT THE INTRUSIVENESS OF THIS MEASURE, IT IS MORE LIKELY TO BE NEGOTIABLE IF PRESENTED IN A CAREFULLY DEFINED FORM WHICH EMPHASISES ADEQUATE PARTICIPATION BY THE AUTHORITIES OF THE INSPECTED COUNTRY.

35. CONCLUSION: DEPENDING ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NEGOTIATING SITUATION, THE ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER ADVANCING A CAREFULLY DEFINED "OPEN SKIES" PROPOSAL, THE DETAILS OF WHICH REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY. THE MEASURE WOULD COMPLEMENT GROUND OBSERVATION TEAMS - NOT SERVE AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO THEM.

D. USE OF MILITARY LIAISON MISSIONS (MLMS) TO MONITOR AGREED WITHDRAWALS AND/OR POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS IN EAST GERMANY

36. THIS MEASURE WAS ASSESSED WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AND WAS FOUND TO BE UNACCEPTABLE FOR POLITICAL REASONS.

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NSAE-00 PA-04 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 USIA-15 TRSE-00

SAM-01 SAJ-01 H-03 NSC-10 SS-20 OIC-04 IO-14 AEC-11

ACDA-19 OMB-01 EB-11 DRC-01 /176 W

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SECDEF WASHDC

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

USNMR SHAPE

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V. RECOMMENTDATIONS

38. THE ALLIES SHOULD DEGOTIATE THE DEPLOYMENT OF AN OVERT INSPECTION SYSTEM TO COVER WITHDRAWALS, POST-REDUCTION FORCE LEVELS BEGIN BRACKET, AND, TO THE EXTENT REQUIRED, COLLATERAL STABILISING MEASURES END BRACKET. EITHER BEGIN BRACKET IT SHOULD BE A REASONABLY DENSE SYSTEM OF MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS, OVER FIXED

OBSERVATION POSTS AND FOR TACTICAL REASONS, THE ALLIES SHOULD PROPOSE FIXED POSTS TO THE OTHER SIDE ONLY IF MOBILE TEAMS PROVE NON-NEGOTIABLE. END BRACKET OR BEGIN BRACKET IT SHOULD BE A REASONABLY DENSE SYSTEM OF MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS SUPPORTED BY SOME FIXED POSTS AND, IF APPROPRIATE, BY SOME MEASURES OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. SHOULD A COMBINATION OF MOBILE TEAMS AND FIXED POSTS PROVE NON-NEGOTIABLE, MOBILE TEAMS SHOULD BE NEGOTIATED. END BRACKET OR BEGIN BRACKET IT COULD BE A SYSTEM OF MOBILE INSPECTION TEAMS SUPPLEMENTED BY STATIC POSTS AND SUPPORTED, IF APPROPRIATE, BY SOME MEASURES OF AERIAL RECONNAISSANCE. THE EXACT DETAILS OF SUCH A SYSTEM WOULD DEPEND ON FURTHER ANALYSIS AND ON THE NATURE OF AGREED
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REDUCTIONS AND COLLATERAL MEASURES. DEFINITIVE EVALUATION OF THE DIFFERENT VERIFICATION METHODS HAS NOT YET BEEN POSSIBLE AS CERTAIN POLITICAL PROBLEMS STILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED. END BRACKET SPECIFIC PROPOSALS SHOULD BE PUT FORWARD ONLY AT A RELATIVELY LATE STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHEN, IN ARGUING FOR THEIR ACCEPTANCE, THE ALLIES CAN RELATE THEM TO THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF REDUCTIONS BEGIN BRACKET AND COLLATERAL MEASURES END BRACKET.

FOOT NOTES:

(1) THE MBFR WORKING GROUP IS PREPARING A REPORT, EXPECTED SOON, ON THE AMOUNT OF ADDITIONAL WARNING TIME WHICH MIGHT RESULT FROM MBFR (AND FROM OVERT INSPECTION IN THE MBFR CONTEXT). THE LATEST DRAFT IS AC/276-WP(73)32(3RD REVISE).

(2) REFERENCE IS MADE TO AC/276-D(72)1 ON ACCEPTABILITY OF INSPECTION TO NATO.

(3) IT IS ENVISAGED TO ATTACH THOSE PORTIONS OF THE 5TH OCTOBER US PAPER TO WHICH THE MBFR WORKING GROUP REPORT REFERES.

(4) AC/276-WP(70)35(REVISED), PARAGRAPH 27 OF APPENDIX B TO ANNEX.

(5) THESE FIXED POSTS ARE DESCRIBED IN THE US PAPER OF 5TH OCTOBER, PAGES 45-50.

(6) ONE DELEGATION OBSERVED THAT THE MODALITIES OF AIRBORNE RECONNAISSANCE, E.G. THE QUESTION OF USING SENSORS PROVIDED BY THE OTHER SIDE, WILL REQUIRE FURTHER STUDY.

END TEXT
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Message Attributes

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